The egalitarian default is principally created by Rawls's hostility to morally arbitrary sources of inequalities, such as the natural and social endowments for which we can take no credit. On Cohen's reading of Rawls, morally arbitrary facts
should not, as a deep matter of justice, enjoy any influence on the selection of principles of justice. Such influence would be problematic, from the standpoint of justice, even if the resulting inequalities made the worst-off better off than they would otherwise be. Nonetheless, the fact that these inequalities do make the unavoidably worst-off better off than they would otherwise be may give us a strong independent moral reason to approve of them. Cohen calls this further source of support for incentives the "Pareto Argument" for inequality. 5 To illustrate in greater detail the central point of the Pareto Argument, let us imagine that the preliminary, anti-arbitrariness considerations prompt Rawlsian agents to select a distribution, D1, which is free of morally arbitrary inequalities.
Imagine now that D1 is Pareto-inferior to an achievable unequal Pareto-superior distribution, D2: compared to D1, D2 is better for everyone, and worse for no one, though it does introduce morally arbitrary inequalities which were absent in D1.
Having steered themselves to D1, these agents will consider it irrational to stay there, if they can opt for D2 instead. The difference principle, which permits D2, is therefore the joint product of two separate sets of considerations, which jointly commend an initially equal distribution (i.e. D1), but then embrace, in preference to D1, an unequal distribution (i.e. D2) if D2 is better for everyone or at least some people (the worst-off in particular), and worse for no one.
Cohen does not object as such to the fact that the terminus of this journey is D2, rather than D1. Nonetheless, he advances two significant objections against the Pareto Argument.
First, the part of the journey that takes us from D1 to D2 cannot be endorsed by the value of justice in particular. This is because the considerations which favour egalitarianism, and thus the initial selection of D1, stand in tension with the considerations fuelling the Pareto Argument, and thus which favour the selection of D2 over D1. Replacing D1 with D2, even if D2 makes everyone better off and no one worse off, will simply re-introduce the morally arbitrary inequalities which the earlier selection of D1 had managed to avoid. Accordingly, D2 will have a specific justice-centred defect that D1 lacked, even if D2 is more choiceworthy, all things considered.
Second, the Pareto Argument overlooks other possibilities for improving the position of the worst-off, which places the argument in a more flattering light than it really deserves. Rawlsian agents are not faced with a brute "manna from heaven" choice between D1 and D2. They are not forced, as of necessity, to choose between the equality enshrined by D1 and the Pareto-optimality enshrined by D2. The highflying talented agents are, after all, effectively choosing to withhold the labour or services that would improve the prospects of the least advantaged in the absence of higher payment. For typical values of D1 and D2, where D2 is Pareto-superior to D1, high-flying conscientious Rawlsians could opt to produce a third distribution, D3, which is Pareto-superior to D1 but Pareto-incomparable with D2 (since the better-off in D3 will not be as well off as the better-off are in D2). In D3, the worstoff are as well off as they are in D2, but there are no more morally arbitrary inequalities contained in D3 than there were in D1. This demonstrates, for Cohen, that Pareto-optimality is not, in fact, incompatible with equality, and it raises the question of why conscientious justice-seeking individuals should not seek to benefit the worse-off in ways which also avoid placing them at the losing end of morally arbitrary inequalities.
Having amassed this background, we are now in a position to turn to the Freedom Objection, which comes in two versions: a more general version, concerned with the underlying spirit of Rawls's position; and a more specifically Rawlsian version, concerned with the letter of Rawls's position. 6 I will refer to these versions of the Freedom Objection as the First Version and Second Version, respectively.
The First Version of the Freedom Objection appeals to a "trilemma claim" or "trilemma problem," which aims to demonstrate that the following principles cannot be co-satisfied:
1. A distribution which avoids morally arbitrary inequalities. [Equality] 2. A distribution which is Pareto-optimal, or which would be better for some, and worse for no one. 7 [Pareto] 3. A distribution which upholds freedom of occupational choice. 8 [Freedom] To illustrate the trilemma problem, consider Sarah's personal job-andincome preferences, which, on Cohen's stipulation, conform to the following preference ordering, from the most-preferred (a) to the least-preferred (c):
(a) Working as a doctor for £50,000 per annum.
(b) Working as a gardener for £20,000 per annum.
(c) Working as a doctor for £20,000 per annum. 9 If the same salary is appended to doctoring and gardening, Sarah prefers gardening, but she can be coaxed into doctoring for the higher salary of £50,000 per annum, which will compensate her for the sacrifice she makes in doctoring rather than gardening during her working hours. It is assumed here that £20,000 per annum is the egalitarian salary. 10 It is also assumed that none of these options imposes notable welfare losses on Sarah: although she definitely prefers gardening to doctoring, doctoring will not constitute a life of drudgery. 11 Sarah's preference ordering easily illustrates why the trilemma presents
Cohen with a challenge. To realize the value of Equality, Sarah will have to choose either (b) or (c). The choice of (a) will introduce a morally arbitrary inequality, since Sarah's award of £50,000 for doctoring will reflect her possession of talent which is, at bottom, morally arbitrary. To realize the value of Pareto, Sarah will have to choose (a) or (c). Choosing either (b) or (c) will preserve the egalitarian distribution, but it is assumed in Cohen's example that the social value of Sarah's doctoring activity far exceeds the social value of her gardening activity. Even if Sarah has to be paid £50,000 rather than £20,000 per annum to coax her into working as a doctor, the community as a whole will still be better off if Sarah spends her working life doctoring than if she spends it gardening.
So far, satisfaction of Equality and satisfaction of Pareto are not disjoint: (c) 16 out of moral inspiration. Moreover-and this is the crucial point-morally inspired action is not unfree action. If Sarah chooses to doctor for £20,000 because she thinks she morally ought to, then each of the claims in the trilemma will be satisfied. Her choice will achieve three things: first, the resulting distribution will satisfy Equality; second, it will be Pareto-superior to the equal distribution that would result if Sarah were to choose to garden for £20,000, thus satisfying Pareto; and third, it will uphold Freedom, since the outcome conforms to her own free, morally inspired, choice. interpretation. The second of them is concerned with the connection between freedom and our moral beliefs. This is the subjective interpretation. These interpretations are separate because, while our beliefs aim at truth, these beliefs may of course be false. The distinction between subjective and objective interpretations is explicitly noted by Cohen, who, leaning on what he describes as the "polyinterpretability of the term "constrain"," draws the distinction between constraints imposed by "morality as such" and by "one's own moral commitment." 17 The constraints imposed by "morality as such" match the objective interpretation, while the constraints imposed by "one's own moral commitment" deliver the subjective interpretation. Whichever of these interpretations we focus on, however, Cohen contends that the Restriction Worry is misplaced. 18 I will examine his treatment of the two interpretations in turn. I think there is something unsatisfactory about his treatment of each of them.
Consider, first, the objective interpretation. As we know, Cohen argues that justice, as Rawls conceives it at a deep level, requires the elimination of morally arbitrary relative disadvantage. Cohen refers to this principle, in these particular passages, as the "no-inequality restriction." Morality generates many other principles and restrictions as well. One such highly plausible principle, which
Cohen selects at random to illustrate his argument, is the prohibition on homicide, or the "no-homicide moral restriction." Cohen compares them in the following passage, in which the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry is presented with a dilemma:
Either the moral prohibition on murder counts as constraining or it does not. If it does, then it is false that we do not want a morality whose edicts are constraining. But if the no-homicide moral restriction does not constrain, then why should the no-inequality moral restriction be thought to constrain? 19 Cohen thinks that it would be question-begging to assume that the noinequality restriction is false; to do so is "inadmissible." 20 But if that is so, then the no-inequality restriction is in privileged company: its fortunes will track those of the no-homicide restriction. The objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry cannot hope to displace the no-inequality restriction any more than it could hope to displace the no-homicide restriction. But what if, after all, the no-inequality restriction is false? Then there is, in effect, nothing to discuss. The objective interpretation will not be in play if the no-inequality restriction does not qualify as an objective moral principle.
In short, then, Cohen is presenting the proponent of the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry with a dilemma. Either it is too late for the no-inequality restriction to be challenged by the Restriction Worry, simply in virtue of its being a prescription of objective morality. This is the first horn. Or it is too early to invoke the Restriction Worry, simply in virtue of the fact that the noinequality restriction does not even qualify as a prescription of objective morality.
That is the second horn. Either way, there will be nothing for Cohen to worry about under this particular heading. 21 The concern effaces itself, and now, it would seem, the fate of the Restriction Worry must stand or fall on the subjective interpretation.
What should we make of Cohen's treatment of the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry? Cohen is correct to this extent: if the no-inequality restriction can be deemed to be morally unimpeachable, then it will be as secure as the no-homicide restriction. It will indeed be too late to challenge the no-inequality restriction by appealing to freedom of occupational choice. So the first horn seems secure. But Cohen's argument is still dialectically unsatisfactory. For what is, or ought to be, under consideration at this point in the argument is the no-inequality restriction's claim to be an objective prescription of morality. Can the no-inequality restriction's claim to unimpeachability still be challenged by its incursions into personal freedom?
Cohen says that it would beg the question against him to assume that the no-inequality restriction is false. And so it would. But this is not what is going on in the Rawlsian argument. The no-inequality restriction is not being assumed in advance to be false. Nor is it question-begging to allow the stringency of the noinequality restriction to be called into question by the claim that it intrudes into personal freedom. The objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry challenges Cohen's position by suggesting that strict compliance with the no-inequality restriction curtails a valuable freedom-freedom of occupational choice-which will, in turn, render it impossible to co-achieve the three principles of the trilemma.
Since we know that Rawls places value on freedom of occupational choice, as a privileged route to an individual's self-realization and self-expression, we have the makings of a perfectly intelligible explanation of why Rawls does not insist that individuals' personal choices conform to the no-inequality restriction, and why any understanding to the contrary would actually imperil their self-realization. If individuals' choices did conform to the no-inequality restriction, they would be curtailing-albeit voluntarily-this particular area of personal sovereignty which Rawls's theory awards to them. Since, according to the Freedom Objection, we have very good reasons to provide for this area of personal sovereignty, we have all the material we need for explaining why, in justice as fairness, the no-inequality restriction is not strict, and holds only when freedom of occupational choice has already been provided for. Rawls's theory of justice, in short, is complex: it combines provision for the basic liberties with provision for rough distributive equality of the social primary goods. 22 If this is not the challenge posed by the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry, then what is the challenge supposed to amount to?
It is, in fact, Cohen who arguably begs the question about the objective interpretation by appearing to assume that freedom of occupational choice does not stand in tension with the no-inequality restriction. To illustrate these questionbegging tendencies, imagine that we are testing the credentials of an avowedly implausible moral principle, whose content can be glossed as the no-premarital-sex principle. The major feature of the no-premarital-sex principle I want to emphasize here, aside from its implausibility, lies in the source of its implausibility. Let us agree that the no-premarital-sex principle is implausible, at least in part, because it denies unmarried adult men and women the opportunities, conditional upon the consent of others, to conduct their sexual lives as they see fit. 23 That is, the nopremarital-sex principle will infringe upon our personal freedom. Now assume, as before, that the Restriction Worry is articulated as a challenge to the no-premaritalsex restriction. Defenders of the no-premarital-sex restriction-I am not, of course, counting Cohen as one of them-might then distinguish, as before, between the objective interpretation and the subjective interpretation of the Restriction Worry.
And, to defend the no-premarital-sex principle against the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry, they might elect to advance the following argument, which precisely mirrors Cohen's defence of the no-inequality moral restriction:
Either the moral prohibition on murder counts as constraining or it does not. If it does, then it is false that we do not want a morality whose edicts are constraining. But if the no-homicide moral restriction does not constrain, then why should the no-premarital-sex moral restriction be thought to constrain?
As before, a dilemma for the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry opens up for critics of the no-premarital-sex restriction. On the first horn of it, it will be too late for those critics to raise the Restriction Worry if the no-premaritalsex restriction is already a prescription of objective morality. We should not allow questions to be begged in advance against the no-premarital-sex restriction. On the second horn of it, it will be too early to invoke the In the relevant dialectical sense, the no-inequality restriction operates like the no-premarital-sex restriction. Rawlsians who advance the Freedom Objection appeal to the value of freedom of occupational choice precisely to disarm Cohen's opposition to Rawlsian incentives. 24 It is because Rawls is committed to freedom of occupational choice and other sorts of freedom that he does not insist that individuals be guided by the no-inequality restriction all the way down, 25 And again:
If we stipulate that a person acts freely when and only when he does what he would most like to do, prescinding from his generosity and in disregard of the norms he endorses, then the trilemma problem is insoluble, but also uninteresting. 27 Cohen's view, as it emerges from these passages, is fairly clear: when we act, we act for various reasons, and those reasons at least typically reflect what values we think apply to the situation we are in. It is myopic to think that these values encroach upon our freedom. Properly understood, they provide structure, not constraint; our values shape our view of the situation we are in, so that our responses to it can be rendered intelligible.
As far as it goes, this claim seems reasonable. The values we believe in, and which shape our actions, are not necessarily antithetical to freedom. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how the subjective interpretation of the Restriction Worry, in and by itself, can make much of a difference to the fate of the Freedom Objection.
The original point of distinguishing it from the objective interpretation, after all, was that our beliefs can fail to be aligned with the truth of the principles which they aim to track. If an agent endorses norms which are simply indefensible, then it cannot be much of a recommendation of a theory that it makes provision for the agent's unobstructed pursuit of those mistaken norms. (It may not count strongly against the theory, but it will not count strongly in favour of it, either.) Of course, an agent's "generosity" is unlikely to be a norm we find ourselves questioning. The same goes for the norm of justice, suitably broadly construed. But it is not generosity or the broad concept of justice, but a much more fine-grained theory of justice, which is supposed to be driving Cohen's picture here, and we already know For the sake of completeness, and because the first two interpretations have now come under heavy attack, we should consider a third and distinct possibility, which Cohen does not explicitly consider, but which, conceivably, he may have had in mind. This interpretation combines elements of the objective interpretation and the subjective interpretation. Its possibility arises out of Cohen's fondness for the phrase "morally inspired", which might, after all, admit of a factive interpretation.
Call this third interpretation the hybrid interpretation. On the hybrid interpretation, freedom is preserved when three conditions are satisfied: first, the agent's actions are explained by her moral beliefs; second, the agent's beliefs are true, or maximally adequate; 28 and third, her morally inspired actions are not obstructed. If we adopt the hybrid interpretation, we will not have to worry about the frustration of subjective moral freedom in cases where agents clearly hold false moral beliefs, such as the Stockholm syndrome case.
Though initially promising, the appeal to the hybrid interpretation carries two dangers. First, it still collects all the criticisms which originally accrued to Cohen's treatment of the objective interpretation. It remains the case that Rawls's account has not been granted a fair hearing. Second, and in any case, the hybrid interpretation risks being ad hoc. If there is a separate story to acknowledge about the Restriction Worry and an agent's subjective stance to the moral principles she espouses, it is not obvious why the agent's beliefs have to be true. What will matter, once again, is that she possesses those beliefs, and that she is acting on them. Now I have argued that there is no such separate story to acknowledge when we look at the subjective interpretation alone, independently of how the objective interpretation fares. As a result, however, I believe that we can be relatively dismissive of the hybrid interpretation, as well as the subjective interpretation.
III. Why Not Stalinism?
We turn now to Cohen's way of handling the Second Version of the Freedom Objection. Cohen's main business here is to press hard on the distinction between we should simply eschew Stalinist policies. We should not legally enforce occupational choice. We should leave individuals legally free to select, or to decline to select, the occupational choices which justice may demand of them.
To further test Cohen's position, we need to pay attention to two important passages which contribute to his argument. I will label them "Passage A" and "Passage B":
The value of freedom lies in the absence of coercion itself, not in the absence of legitimate moral demands that, being legitimate, cannot be absent. 32 
Passage B:
It is of the nature of liberty that it leaves choices open, and, therefore, it is of the nature of the liberty principle that it should apply to the structure of choice alone and be indifferent to the content of choice. It is not of the nature of distributive justice that it should be silent on the content of choice within the right structure. 33 As I hope to show, there is something awry about Cohen's anti-Stalinist argument.
First, consider Cohen's claim in Passage A that "[t]he value of freedom lies in the absence of coercion itself." But that cannot be because coercion is straightforwardly antithetical to freedom. Even if Sarah is coerced into doctoring at £20,000, Cohen's view, which is clearly stated in his other work and is plausible in its own right, is that Sarah is also free to doctor for that salary. 34 If freedom is a matter of having an unobstructed opportunity to do something, 35 then coercion, far from dismantling that freedom, actually ensures its existence. If Sarah has no choice other than to doctor for £20,000, then she is free to doctor for £20,000. The lack of opportunity to do otherwise does not mean that she lacks the freedom to do what she is being made to do. What is removed, if Sarah is coerced into doctoring for £20,000, is her freedom not to doctor for £20,000. It is when, and only when, Sarah has both the freedom to work as a doctor for £20,000 and the freedom to decline to doctor for £20,000 that she can be properly regarded as being able to work as a doctor for £20,000 freely. Since Sarah's freedom to work as a doctor for £20,000 is entirely compatible with Stalinist forcing, it must therefore be the combination of Sarah's freedom to work as a doctor for £20,000 together with her freedom not to work as a doctor for £20,000 which is of central importance to Cohen's attempt to disarm the Stalinist Worry.
Further support for this interpretation is offered by Cohen's remark, in Passage B, that "it is of the nature of the liberty principle that it should apply to the structure of choice alone and be indifferent to the content of choice." Cohen's reference to the "structure of choice" confirms that he is concerned with the existence of alternate options in Sarah's opportunity set. Sarah must have the ability to decline to doctor for £20,000 if her freedom to doctor for £20,000 is to be considered valuable.
Passage B also teaches us something else, which is that his treatment of the Stalinist Worry is standing in tension with the "ethical solution" he provides to the trilemma problem. What matters in his reply to the Stalinist Worry is not the freedom which is preserved in and through Sarah's morally shaped choices, but the existence of an opportunity set: Sarah must enjoy the opportunity among different options to be guided by, or decline to be guided by, her moral convictions, whatever they are. It follows that Cohen's way of dealing with the Stalinist Worry, arising from the Second Version of the Freedom Objection, appears inconsistent with his way of dealing with the First Version of the Freedom Objection. 36 The reply to the First Version requires only that Sarah's freedom is preserved if she doctors for £20,000 out of moral conviction, whereas the reply to the Second Version requires that Sarah's freedom is preserved only if she has the freedom not to doctor for £20,000.
Can this tension be assuaged? Cohenians might concede that the solution to the Stalinist Worry (which requires the existence of an opportunity set) is considerably more demanding than the solution to the trilemma argument (which requires the existence only of morally inspired choices), but insist that there is no outright inconsistency between these solutions. After all, morally inspired choices can still unfold within a framework of alternate options. This point is true, as far as it goes, but we have already seen that Cohen places a heavy emphasis, in his discussion of the trilemma problem, on the claim that nothing other than the possibility of morally inspired choice is required to make that problem go away, because nothing other than morally inspired choice is required to uphold freedom.
So if Cohen contends that we actually need more than moral inspiration to uphold the value of freedom, his argument against the First Version of the Freedom Objection will have been exposed, by his own lights, as inadequate. We are still left with a puzzle. 37 Cohen convincing. 38 Cohen makes four further points in connection with this issue. 39 First, he thinks that coercive enforcement may be counterproductive: to avoid their exposure to Stalinist frogmarching, individuals may be motivated to conceal their talents and preferences. Second, and partly as a result, there will be informational deficits and distortions that arise, which will make Stalinist central planning crude and highly inefficient. Third, Stalinist enforcement will make it difficult for individuals to act from a sense of justice, since this specifically moral motivation will be crowded out by individuals' concerns to escape punishment or penalization. Fourth, Cohen is concerned that Stalinist frogmarching involves the "manipulation" of persons, since it involves "a control over your behaviour that exercises a knowledge of the intimacies of your personality, what pleases you, what bores you, and so forth"; he glosses this last consideration as the "invasion of the inner economy" objection. 40 These problems will of course always obtain in the real world, taking people and policies as they are. Still, the first two of these considerations notably step outside the idealized assumptions which characterize much of Cohen's discussion, failure not to work as a doctor for that salary, Sarah is not thereby precluded from acting on moral inspiration. This is because the explanation of why Sarah chooses to doctor, if and when she does choose to doctor, need not be that she is unable to refrain, without penalty, from doctoring. Sarah can still conform, out of moral inspiration, to the law which obliges her to work as a doctor. 41 She can still be morally committed to the course of action which the law compels her to perform, even when declining that course of action is not available to her. This case has the approximate structure of a Frankfurt case. 42 It may be over-determined that Sarah will doctor for £20,000, since, if inspiration fails her, she will be coerced into doing so anyway. But the fact that a Stalinist system will not permit Sarah to do anything except to doctor for £20,000 does not rob of her of the ability to make that choice out of moral conviction. Compare anti-homicide laws: I can be morally committed to not performing acts of homicide even if, were I to do so, I would reliably be caught and convicted. Despite the fact that I would be severely punished for these offences, I can still refrain from committing them for the right reasons, rather than for purely self-interested reasons. I can refrain from murdering other people because I think it is wrong to do so, not just because I want to avoid a lengthy prison sentence.
Reservations must also attach to Cohen's contention that Stalinist frogmarching involves the invasion of the inner economy, or the objectionable manipulation of people. The main problem here is that Cohen has already provided room for the first-person prerogative, which is meant to uphold each person's sense of herself as "something other than an engine for the welfare of other people." 43 It is unclear what additional substantial critical opposition Cohen can muster against a looser form of Stalinist conscription that respected this bounded prerogative. 44 Taken together, Cohen's collected offerings against the Stalinist Worry suggest the presence of commitments which outrun his possession of the arguments which are needed to properly ground those commitments.
IV. How to Back into Stalinism (Without Really Trying)
Cohen is not, of course, precluded from enrolling other possible moral considerations into his opposition to the range of powers assumed by a Stalinist regime. After all, history books are awash with details of the crimes committed by Stalin's regime, as well as other twentieth century regimes that approximated to it in its cruelty and severity. The concern to avoid show trials, a sclerotic economy, and the general obliteration of private and family life that have been encouraged by overweening Stalinist-type states will surely be enough to confirm the lack of wisdom in tolerating a state that removed freedom of occupational choice. So
Cohen may say; and who would disagree with him? Though Cohen's anti-Stalinism, as a concrete political commitment, is of course to be applauded, 45 this line of argument is incomplete, for our typical hostility to the prospect of occupational forcing seems clearly distinct from our objections to these other atrocities. Many of us would regard occupational conscription as objectionable in its own right, and not just as an indirect source of evidence that the state had assumed powers that were suddenly pointing in the direction of more gross and obvious moral outrages. 46 Interestingly, Cohen also concedes that, in the right circumstances, he would actually endorse legislation regarding job allocation, albeit non-coercive legislation. He writes, about the (doubtlessly unattainable) "truly just society" which consisted only of conscientious egalitarians:
Informational problems would prevent the [ideal] state from … (noncoercively) legislating job allocation. But if it could do so, under a properly prerogative-informed egalitarian principle, then I would see nothing wrong with that. 47 This turns out to be a costly concession, for the worry which now arises is that the reference to non-coercive legislation appears to be a merely contingent and 
